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I. INTRODUCTION

As technology and the development of complex societies has evolved and expanded,
international trade has increasingly become the cornerstone of the world economy.' As a
result of this rapid evolution and expansion the environment has suffered serious degradation
and depletion.2 Only recently has concern developed among countries that trade agreements

1. In 1991, the United States' trade turnover with Canada and Mexico totaled over $176.3 billion and
$64 billion respectively. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. Library of Congr. (CRS) 11390140, at 2-3
(Sept. 21, 1992).
2. For example, annually in the United States since 1982, 2,000 to 3,000 oil spills, originating from
approximately 650,000 oil storage facilities, have been reported to the federal government. Donald Smith, Oil
Tank Spills Peril Suburban Enclaves, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1993, at A22. Additionally, since the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill there have been major oil spills in the oceans off of Rhode Island, Texas, New York, New
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are having an adverse effect on the environment.' When the United States, Canada, and
Mexico began negotiating a free trade agreement they recognized the existence of potential
conflicts between free trade among countries and environmental protection and joined in an
effort to create a multinational trade agreement which would contain provisions designed to
protect environmental concerns.4
These efforts resulted in the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)5 which has been heralded as the "greenest free trade agreement.., ever."6 The
leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico announced the completion of the
negotiations for NA1FTA on August 12, 1992. 7 The agreement is expected to increase U.S.
exports, expand investment opportunities, and boost international competitiveness by
eliminating tariffs and trade barriers over a fifteen year period.'
Despite concern by many public interest groups that NAFTA will negatively affect the
environment,9 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has strongly endorsed it.'0
Specifically, the EPA stated that NAFTA marks an evolution in the history of environmental

Jersey, California, Morocco, France, Italy, and Australia. Marguerite Holloway, Soiled Shores; Prince William
Sound Oil Spill 1989 Trends in Environmental Technology, 265 Sd. AM. 102 (1991). In January 1993, 25
million gallons of oil were spilled off of Scotland's coast. Smith, supra. A month earlier, off the coast of Spain
a tanker spilled 23 million gallons, which is about double the volume of oil that was spilled from the Exxon
Valdez. Tanker Grounde4 Spilling Crude Oil Off Coastof Scotland's Shetland Isles, 16 Int'l Envil. Rep. (BNA)
5 (Jan. 13, 1993). In addition to the world's petroleum pollution problems, each year the U.S. generates about
10 billion metric tons of solid waste from both industrial and municipal sources. Philip R. O'Leary ct al.,
ManagingSolid Waste, 259 Sci. AM. 36 (1988). Additionally, around 45 million acres of the world's tropical
rain forests disappear each year and along with each acre about 50 to 100 species of animals become extinct
every day. Too Much, Too Fast,NEWSwEEK, June, 1 1992, at 34.
3. See Kyle E. MeSlarrow, InternationalTradeandthe Environment:Building a Frameworkfor Conflict
Resolution, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10589 (Oct. 1991).
4. Id. See Testimony Before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology: U.S. House of
Representatives, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992) available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database [hereinafter
Testimony] (testimony of Charles E. Roh, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for North American Affairs).
5.
North AmerirAm Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 17, 1992, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA database
[hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA was signed by former President Bush on December 17, 1992, and is awaiting
approval by the legislatures of all three contracting countries. [Ed.]
6.
News Conference with William Reilly, EPA AdministratorRe: North American Free TradeAgreement,
Fed. News Serv. (Aug. 13, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Reilly
Conference]. See, e.g., Reilly Says NAFTA Gives Precedence to Environmental Treaties Allowing Sanctions, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1448 (Aug. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Reilly discusses NAFTA]; Roger W. Wallace, North
American Free Trade Agreement: GeneratingJobsfor Americans, Bus. AM., April 8, 1991, at 3.
7. North American Free TradeAgreement, supra note I, at 1. Negotiations between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico began in June of 1991. Id.
8.
Michael Boskin, Questionsand Answers About the North American Free TradeArea, Market Rep.,
June 18, 1991 available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File. Mexico is currently one of the top U.S.
consumers. Wallace, supra note 6, at 5. The volume of exports to Mexico from the United States is ranked third
behind Japan and Canada. Id.
9. See, e.g., Citizen Groups Blast Clause in NAFTA Text, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1730-31 (Oct. 7,
1992) [hereinafter Citizens Blast] (stating that Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth find fault
with NAFTA); Public Citizen Says NAFTA Summary Falls Short on Environmental Issues, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1502 (Aug. 26, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA Falls Short] (questioning whether NAFTA will uphold U.S.
health, safety, and environmental standards); News Conference With Brad Blackwelder, Friends of the Earth,
Ralph Nader, Public Citizen, Michael McClosky, Sierra Club Re: North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Fed. News Sere. (Oct. 6, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter News
Conference] (stating that the problems with NAFTA are so fundamental that the text must be renegotiated).
10. Reilly Conference, supra note 6.
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protection, because it is the most environmentally sensitive trade agreement ever negotiated
1
and thus, it will improve the quality of the environment in North America. Logically, the
12
EPA's statement implies that NAFTA contains provisions to safeguard the environment.
However, some environmental groups disagree with the EPA's assessment of NAFTA
because they feel it will make U.S. environmental laws vulnerable to attack as trade
barriers." This vulnerability may lead to the removal or reexamination of certain U.S.
14
environmental regulations, resulting in a lowering of U.S. environmental standards.
oppose
that
This Comment addresses the concerns voiced by the environmental groups
the proposed agreement by focusing on two main issues. The first concerns whether U.S.
environmental regulations are subject to challenges as trade barriers by Canada or Mexico.
The second concerns how NAFTA will affect U.S. environmental regulations. As a practical
matter, it is necessary to fully explore the trade barrier issue in order to adequately address
how NAFTA will affect U.S. environmental regulations. Both issues require analysis of the
relevant textual provisions of NAFTA. In addition, since NAFTA explicitly states throughout
its text that various articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are
5
applicable to particular circumstances, this Comment also includes a discussion of GATT.
Part I1of this Comment focuses on the background and history leading up to the creation
of NAFTA. Part III addresses whether U.S. environmental regulations are subject to
challenges as trade barriers by exploring the appropriate provisions under both GATT and
NAFTA. In particular, this section discusses the standards that exist within both GATT and

11.

Reilly discusses NAFTA, supra note 6, at 1448.

12.
13.

Id.

See Charles Pearson, Environmentand InternationalEconomic Policy,in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE:
TE RElATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 46, 46-48 (Seymour J. Rubin &
Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982); WILLIAM J, MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 235 (1985)
(defining the term a trade barrier). A trade barrier is the restrictive effect of a tax, tariff, quota, or environmental
regulation on an import or export and refers to constraints upon the exchange of goods between countries.
Pearson, supra, at 48; MILLER, supra, at 235. Trade barriers often take the form of tariffs, quotas, or non-tariff
barriers. Pearson, supra, at 46-48; MiLLER, supra, at 235. In the environmental context, the non-tariff barrier
is the most common type of trade barrier found and typically encompasses the use of technical specifications,
environmental and administrative regulations, and testing procedures. See McSlarrow, supra note 3, at 10592.
14. See, e.g., NAFTA: Environmental Concerns, INT'L ENVT.. L., Oct. 17, 1991, at 254 (discussing
environmentalists* concerns regarding the Bush Administration's lack of commitment to include environmental
safeguards in the agreement); NAFTA Falls Short, supra note 9, at 1502 (stating that U.S. standards could be
challenged as trade barriers); Senate Finance Committee, Fed. News Serv. (Sept. 22, 1992) availablein LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File (expressing remarks made by Tom Donahue, the Chairman of the Labor Advisory
Committee on Trade Negotiations, stating that U.S. health and safety standards could be challenged as trade
barriers); Rose Gutfeld, Keeping It Green, WAil. ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R9 (questioning whether the
environment is the "big loser" in a free-trade pact); News Conference, supra note 9 (stating that the problems
with NAFTA are so fundamental that the text must be renegotiated); Citizens Blast, supra note 9, at 1730-31
(stating that Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth find fault with NAFTA).
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GAITI. GATT came into force in January of 1948, and was intended to merely implement a tariff

negotiation. Kenneth Abbott, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT), 1 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 3
(1989). Subsequently, it has become a central element in the law of international trade. Id. GATT was to operate
on its own only until a more complete International Trade Organization (ITO) could be established. Id. Because
the U.S. failed to adopt the ITO charter, GATT became the primary method for implementing a liberal
international trade policy with the other signatory countries. Id. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADINO SYSTEM 27-57 (1989) [hereinafter WORLD TRADiNO SYSTEM]; JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING
AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE AND GATI] (providing a- more comprehensive
treatment of GATI').
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NAFTA and how the two agreements resolve the trade barrier issue. Finally, Part IV focuses
on the possible effects that NAFTA will have on U.S. environmental regulations. This
inquiry under NAFTA includes determining how a dispute panel ruling is implemented.
Additionally, Part IV will question whether, as a result of the conclusions in Part II, NAFTA
creates loopholes such that a Canadian or Mexican business could import a product into the
U.S. regardless of whether it violates a U.S. environmental regulation. Part V concludes this
Comment by addressing the concerns and uncertainties surrounding NAFTA and its effect
uponIU.S. environmental regulations.
]I. HISTORY

A.

Overview of How NAFTA Was Createdand Developed

In February of 1991, then President Bush of the United States, President Salinas of
Mexico, and Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada announced that they intended to negotiate
a trilateral trade agreement. 6 The trilateral negotiations towards a free trade agreement
formally began in June 1991 and proceeded under the fast track authority extended by the
U.S. Congress to President Bush. 7 Under fast track procedure the President has the
authority to negotiate a trade agreement and submit it to Congress for approval without
amendment.' s Fourteen months later the negotiations ended and President Bush announced
the completion of the NAFTA."9
On September 18, 1992, shortly after the negotiations ended, President Bush formally
advised Congress of his intent to sign the agreement." Consistent with fast track
procedures, President Bush waited 90 days before signing the agreement on December 17,
receive approval from the legislatures
1992." Once formally signed, the agreement must
22
of all three countries before coming into force.

16. North American Free Trade Agreement: Issues for Congress, U.S. Library of Congress (CRS) 91282E, at 2 (July 12, 1991) [hereinafter NAFTA: Congress Issues].
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at 1-2. Congress voted to extend fast track
authority to the President for trade agreements reached by May 1993. A North American Free Trade Agreement:
CongressionalConcerns,U.S. Library of Congress (CRS) 91-786E, at 1 (Oct. 22, 1991). Under this authority
as long as the President consults closely with the Congress during negotiations, the Congress agrees to consider
legislation to implement the agreement without amendments and with strict deadlines. Id. See also WORLD
TRADING SYSTEm, supra note 15, at 72-74 (explaining in more detail the background of fast track procedures).
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at 8.
19. Reilly Conference, supra note 6. NAFTA will create one of the largest and richest markets in the
world, generating 360 million producers and consumers and $6 trillion in annual output. Testimony, supra note
4.
20. Senate Finance Committee, supra note 14.
21. Id.
22. PresidentBush Signs NAFTA at Ceremony: Clinton to Meet with Salinas in January,9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2162 (Dec. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Bush Signs]. Implementing legislation may be submitted to
Congress any time after the agreement is signed. Extension of Fast-Track Not Necessary for NAFTA
Supplements, Trade Officials Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Extending FastTrack]. Although fasttrack authority expires at the end of May 1993, unless renewed by Congress, the signing
of NAFTA on December 17 means that the agreement will be considered under fast track procedures. Id.
Therefore, in order for NAFTA to be considered under the existing grant of fast track authority, the agreement
must be submitted to Congress by March, 1993. Id. Once submitted, Congress has 90 legislative days to vote
the agreement up or down with no amendments and then present it to the President for signing. NAFTA:
Implementing Legislation Will Heat Up This Summer, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 143 (Jan. 27, 1993).
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B. Likelihood of CongressionalApproval
Based on the fact that there are a number of influential people that support NAFTA such
as the U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor; the former EPA Administrator, William
Reilly; and President Clinton, it is likely that Congress will approve NAFTA and pass
implementing legislation.23 Additionally, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiations, which is a senior level advisory group composed of representatives from
government, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailers,
consumer interests, and the general public, submitted their support for the agreement and
recommended that NAFTA be signed and implemented. 4
However, there are many environmental and labor groups that oppose the agreement
because they believe certain provisions within NAFTA may hinder environmental standards,
human rights, labor relations, and economic livelihood.'s These groups have suggested that
NAFTA be amended before approval by Congress and the President. 26 Although President
Clinton has endorsed NAFTA, he believes that parallel agreements are needed in order to
adequately address the concerns voiced by NAFTA critics.2 7 Congress is expected to vote
on the implementing legislation sometime during the summer of 1993.8 If NAFTA is
approved under fast track authority it is likely that President Clinton will seek
implementation of parallel agreements to satisfy the opposition's concerns. Alternatively,
if this scenario does not occur, the proposed text may instead be revised to accommodate
these concerns before receiving congressional approval.29
III. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
CHALLENGED As TRADE RESTRICTIONS
This part addresses whetherU.S. environmental regulations are subject to challenges as
trade barriers by exploring the appropriate provisions under both GATT and NAFTA.
A.

Under GATT

GATT plays an important role in the implementation of NAFTA.3 ° Various provisions
of GATT are mentioned throughout the text of NAFTA, thus obligating the United States,
Canada, and Mexico to comply with the selected provisions of GATT as well as NAFTA

23.
24.
25.
21, 1991,
26.

See, e.g. Extending Fast-Track,supra note 22, at 225; Reilly Conference, supra note 6.
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at 8.
Eg., NAFTA Falls Short,supra note 9, at 1502; NAFTA: Clean Fuels Trade, INT'L ENVrL. L., Oct.
at 890 [hereinafter Clean Fuels Trade]; Citizens Blast, supra note 9, at 1730-31.
E-g., NAFTA Falls Short, supra note 9, at 1502; Clean Fuels Trade, supra note 25, at 890; Citizens

Blast, supra note 9, at 1730-31. Although fast track procedure does not allow Congress to make amendments

to the agreement, Congress has the power to change the fast track procedures if it chooses. North American Free
Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at 1.
27.

Bush Signs, supra note 22, at 2162.

28. Trade Expert Urges More Monitoring of Preferential Trade Agreements, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
2182 (Dec. 23, 1992).

29.

Bush Signs, supra note 22, at 2162. President Clinton has endorsed NAFTA, but has called for

supplemental agreements to address concerns regarding labor standards, the environment, and import surges.
Extending Fast-Track, supra note 22, at 225.
30. See NAFTA, supra note 5, arts. 101, 103 (stating that NAFTA is consistent with GATI and that
certain NAFrA provisions reaffirm GATT).
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provisions." For example, chapter 20 of NAFTA provides for dispute resolution under
either NAFTA or GATT. 2 Because GATT plays such a large role in determining how
NAFTA will operate, relevant provisions of GATT merit discussion. Since GATT was put
into effect in 1948,much debate and discussion has been generated between the contracting
countries concerning its terms and applications.33 As a result, there are numerous panel
decisions regarding trade disputes that analyze and interpret the provisions of GATT.34
Therefore, because of the availability of panel decisions, it is more efficient to analyze the
trade barrier issue by initially discussing it under GATT and then determining how the same
issue is resolved under NAFTA.
1.

GA2"Decision Making Process

Although technically under U.S. law GAIT is an executive agreement and not a treaty,
it is applied like a treaty and its obligations are binding under international law. 5 When a
party has a complaint under GATT, the first step is for the aggrieved party to request
consultations with the adverse party.36 If the dispute is not resolved through these
consultations, the complaining party may refer the matter to the GATT Council for
recommendation or resolution of the dispute. At this stage the parties may also request
the formation of a panel composed of three to five independent experts who will review the

31. See NAFTA, supra note 5.
32. Id ch. 20.
33. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 98-99.
34. See, e.g., Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,GAIT Doc.
DS10R (Nov. 7, 1990), reprinted in GATT - BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SM.ECTED DocuMENTs (BISD) 200
(37th supp. 1989-1990) [hereinafter Thai CigaretteRestrictions];United States - Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Productsfrom Canada, GAIT Doc. 145198 (Feb. 22, 1982), reprinted in BISD 91 (29th supp. 19811982) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna Prohibitions];Canada- MeasuresAffecting Exports of UnprocessedHerringand
Salmon, GAIT Doe. 146268 (Mar. 22, 1988), reprinted in BISD 98 (35th supp. 1989) [hereinafter Canada
Herring & Salmon Exports]; United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GAT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3,
1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1991) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna Restrictions]; United States - Taxes on
Petroleumand Certain ImportedSubstances,GAIT Doc. 146175 (June 17, 1987), reprintedin BISD 136 (34th
supp. 1987) [hereinafter U.S. Petroleum Taxes]; United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, GAT Doe. 145333 (May 26,1983), reprintedin BISD 107 (30thsupp. 1983) [hereinafter U.S.Auto
Imports]; The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GAIT Doe. CP.4/39 (April 3, 1950), reprinted in
BISD 188 (vol. 1[ 1952) [hereinafter AustralianSubsidy]; Brazilian InternalTaxes, GATT Doe. CP.3/42 (June
30, 1949), reprinted in BISD 181 (vol. H11952).
35. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 39. Under U.S. law, GATT is an executive agreement
and is treated as a treaty obligation. Proclamation No. 2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8,863 (1947). Although the basic
GAIT treaty never came into force, it is applied as a treaty obligation under international law through the
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA). WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 35. The PPA applies
GAIT provisionally after January 1948 and provides for the full implementation of Part 1,11, and III of GAIT,
articles I-XXXV. Id at 35-36. Therefore, through the PPA, the obligations of GAT are binding under
international law. Id at 39. Normally such agreements are termed treaties and are submitted to the Senate for
two-thirds affirmative vote. See id. at 62-63 (explaining that a treaty under U.S. law may be valid and binding
under international law but not under domestic law unless they are deemed to be self-executing or otherwise
implemented by the government).
36. Dr. Ernst-U. Petersmann, The GATTSettlement System andthe UruguayNegotiations on its Reform,
in LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 53, 61 (Petar Sarcevic & Hans van Houtte eds., 1990).
37. Id. at 64. The GAIT Council is composed of representatives from all GAIT contracting parties that
wish to assume the respcnsibility of effectuating the provisions of GAIT. See WORLD TRADE AND GAIT, supra
note 15, at 48.
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complaint from a legal perspective and complete a report with their findings.3" However,
panel reports remain technically non-binding on the parties until adopted by the GATT
Council.39
4
Once a panel decision is adopted by the GATT Council it is given legal force. " Despite
the fact that panel findings are initially nonbinding, they are usually adopted by the GATT
Council without amendment. 4 This obligates a contracting party to either withdraw their
inconsistent measure or suffer retaliation by the aggrieved party 2
2.

GATT Standards:Are They Clear?

GATT contains several provisions that provide the standards for deciding whether a
U.S. environmental regulation is a barrier to trade.4 3 For example, article HI of GATT,
which applies to the national treatment of products and internal regulations, sets forth general
standards that apply to all products." Article HI states that internal taxes, laws, regulations,
and requirements affecting trade should give imported products no less favorable treatment
than like products of national origin.4" This aspect of the article creates an obligation of
nondiscrimination that is also reflected in other parts of GATT. 48
In addition, article XI sets forth a general rule that quantitative restraints on trade are
prohibited.47 Article XI requires that no party maintain or institute prohibitions or
48
restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges on the importation of any product.
49
However, article XI contains several exceptions to this general rule. One exception with
an environmental feature, applies to import restrictions on agricultural and fisheries
products.5 0 Therefore, if a quantitative restriction does not fit within one of the listed
exceptions, article XI is violated.5 '
Another important provision of GATT is article XX, establishing General Exceptions
that allow a contracting party to maintain certain measures that may otherwise violate the
agreement.5 2 Sections (b) and (g) of article XX specifically pertain to environmental

38. Petersmann, supra note 36, at 64.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., GAIT, supra note 15, arts. III, XI, XX(b),(g).
44. Id. art. II.
45. Id. art. 11(4).
46. Id. arts. 1,111(7), XImI & XVII.
47. Id. art. XI(1). Quantitative restrictions are defined as restrictions other than duties, taxes, or others
charges. Id. These are perceived as absolute limits on the quantity or value of a product permitted to be imported
or exported. ATLANnc CouNcIL OF TE UNrrED STATES, GAIT PLus-A PROPOSAL FOR TRADE REFORM: WITH
THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT 20 (Praeger ed., 1975). For example, quantitative restrictions could
place absolute limits on the quantity or value of goods, prohibit certain products, or require import or export
licenses. Id.
48. GAT supra note 15, art. XI(1).
49. Id.art. XI(2).
50. Id. art. XI(2)(c).
51. Id. art. XI(2). See infra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions found within
article XX of GAT regarding environmental justifications).
52. GAT, supra note 15, art. XX.
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concerns and justifr a party maintaining an environmental regulation that otherwise may
constitute a trade barrier.53 Article XX provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... (g) relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources ifsuch measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. .... 4
However, article X is limited to those measures that do not create arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination between the parties and are not disguised restrictions on trade.55 Therefore,
if the regulation complies with the limitations of article XX, then nothing will prevent the
adoption of measures that are either"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life" or are
"relat[ed] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."5 6 The problem becomes
one of deciding what constitutes "necessary" and what is "related to" in order to determine
whether a regulation falls within one of the exceptions of article XX.
Several GATT panel decisions have established a standard with regard to determining
what the language "necessary" means under GATT.5 7 One of the panel decisions involved
a dispute between the United States and Thailand concerning Thailand's restrictions on the
imports of foreign cigarettes. 8 The United States challenged Thailand's restrictions by
claiming that they constituted an import prohibition that violated GATT. 9 Thailand argued
that its restrictions were justified under article XX(b) because they promoted the health and
safety of its citizens.' The panel found that in order to fall within article XX(b) a measure
must be necessary for the promotion of human, animal, or plant life or health. 6' According
to this GATT panel, the word "necessary" requires considering whether an alternative
62
measure, consistent with GATT, could have reasonably been maintained. If there are
alternative means to accomplish the parties' objectives, then the panel will not allow the
challenged restriction to fall under the exception created by article XX(b).63 The GATT
panel concluded that Thailand could have reasonably maintained other measures consistent

53.

Id. art. XX(b), (g).

54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. art. XX.
57. See, e.g., Thai Cigarette Restrictions, supra note 34, at 200 (finding that the measure was not
necessary and therefore was not within the exception); U.S. Tuna Prohibitions,supranote 34, at 91 (finding that
the measure was not within article XX(g)); U.S. Tuna Restrictions, supra note 34, at 1598 (finding that the
regulation was neither necessary under article XX(b) nor within the scope of XX(g)).
58. Thai Cigarette Restrictions, supra note 34, at 200.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at 222-23.
62. Id. at 200.
63. Thai Cigarette Restrictions, supra supra note 34, at 200.
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with GATT to achieve the same health and safety goals and therefore did not fall within the
scope of article XX(b)."
Likewise, a GATT panel in 1988 established the standards for determining the scope of
the wording in article XX(g).' The dispute involved a prohibition by Canada on exports
of certain species of salmon and herring caught in Canadian waters.66 The United States
alleged that the Canadian restrictions were in violation of GATT. 67 Subsequently, Canada
claimed that the prohibitions were justified under article XX(g). 68 The panel analyzed the
term "relating to" in light of the context of article XX(g).69 It held that the language
"relating to" in this article need not be necessary or essential to conserving a resource as long
as the trade measure is primarily aimed at conservation of the resource.7° Ultimately the
panel held that the export prohibition was not primarily aimed at conserving the fisheries and
thus, Canada could not invoke the exception of article XX(g).'
As a practical matter, GATT is a trade agreement that was designed to further free trade
among nations by reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade.72 As such, it contains very
little protection for environmental concerns.7" Only sections (b) and (g) of article XX offer
some protective assurances that a country can maintain an environmental regulation that may
otherwise violate GATT.7 For this reason it is important to determine how the provisions
of GATT interact with environmental regulations.
3.

Can U.S. Regulations be Viewed as Trade BarriersUnder GA 7T?

Recently, a major GATT panel decision was decided pursuant to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 75 regarding the ability of the United States to place an
embargo on Mexican imports of tuna.76 Under the MMPA, the U.S. imposed certain
restrictions on imports of Mexican tuna, whose consistency with GATT was contested by
Mexico.77 The dispute panel determined that the application of the U.S. import restrictions
on Mexico, as set forth by the MMPA, constituted a violation of GATT.78 The GATT panel
stated that it was not authorized to consider environmental issues that are extraneous to

64. Id.
65. See United States Tuna Prohibitions,supra note 34, at 91. See supra note 48 (discussing article XX
and its language).
66. CanadaHerring & Salmon Exports, supra note 34, at 98.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id.
71. CanadaHerring & Salmon Exports, supra note 34, at 115.
72. See GATF, supra note 15, pmbl.
73.

K. Gwen Beacham, Comment, InternationalTrade andthe Environment: Implicationsof the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Tradefor the Future of EnvironmentalProtectionEfforts, 3 COLO.J. INT'L ENVTL.
& POL'Y. 657 (1992).
74. See GAIT, supra note 15, art. XX.
75. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
76. U.S. Tuna Restrictions,supra note 34, at 1598.
77. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §1361 (1988). Under MMPA, it is illegal to import fish caught with fishing
technology that results in excessive incidental takings of marine mammals. Id. One widely used method that
results in a high number of incidental dolphin killings each year is the purse-sine method of fishing for tuna.
134 CONo. REC. S16336, S16344-45 (1988) (statement of Senator Breaux).
78. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna No. DS21/R, supra note 34, at 1598.
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GATT because a panel's task is limited to examining disputes "in light of the relevant GATT
provisions." 79 This statement, together with the fact that GATT is primarily a trade
agreement, indicates that the panel based its decision on an economic free trade perspective
rather than an environmental perspective."s
In making its decision, The GATT panel considered whether the U.S.'embargo would
come under one of the exceptions set forth in article XX.8 The panel noted that article XX
is to be interpreted narrowly and does not establish obligations itself, but is rather a limited
and conditional exception from the obligations under GATT.82 Similar to the prior GATT
rulings83 the panel found that the word "necessary" in article XX(b) meant that a party had
to exhaust all options reasonably available to it in pursuing its objectives. Therefore, since
the panel found that the United States failed to pursue all reasonable options available, it did
not fall within article XX(b).84
The panel also considered article XX(g) as a possible exception to U.S. obligations
under GATT. 85 The panel found that the application of article XX(g) applied only to
restrictions within the jurisdiction of the United States and did not pertain to restrictions that
applied extrajurisdictionally.86 According to the panel, article XX(b) and (g) only permit
a country to regulate for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or for the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources within its jurisdiction. 7 Subsequently, if an
environmental regulation does not have the protection of article XX(b) or (g), then it must
comply with the remainder of GATT provisions such as article XI which prohibits
quantitative regulations on imports.8 Consequently, the GATT panel found that the United
States' direct import prohibition on tuna from Mexico was inconsistent with article XI(1)."9
Because of the previous GATT panel decisions, it is apparent that future panels may
narrowly interpret the standards of GATT and lean in favor of finding trade barriers." Once

79. Id. at 1622.
80. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, UnitedStates Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L.
142 (1992) (stating that the panel's decision arose from a free trade perspective rather than an environmentalist
perspective).
81. U.S. Tuna Restrictions,supra note 34, at 1598.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of necessary under
GATT).
84. U.S. Tuna Astrictions, supra note 34, at 1598.
85. Id. at 1620.
86. Id. at 1620-21.
87. Id. at 1621.
88. See GAiT, "upra note 15, arts. XI and XX. See also supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text
(discussing GAIT standards).
89. U.S. Tuna Rutrictions,supra note 34, at 1628. This decision in favor of Mexico was not enforced
against the U.S. because at the time of the decision Mexico was negotiating NAFTA and it wanted to maintain
good diplomatic relations with the United States. Mexico Agrees To Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna
Embargo, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1351 (Sept 18, 1991). On October 27, 1992, President Bush signed the
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992. Bush Signs Bill to Protect Dolphins,Says Certain Provisions
Advisory Only, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1872 (Oct. 28, 1992). This Act is designed to lift the ycllowfrm tuna
embargo in place against Mexico under the U.S. MMPA if Mexico agrees to take steps to reduce dolphin
mortality. Bill That Would End Tuna Embargoes Under MMPA To Be Sent To President,9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1760 (Oct 14, 1992).
90. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (regarding the three prior panel rulings). See also
Groups CallForEnvironmental Clausesin North American Free Trade Agreement, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
497 (Sept. 11, 1991) (stating that the reasoning used by GAT panel in the Mexican tuna case can be used to
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a measure is found to be a trade barrier by a panel, the offending party is usually required
to lift the barrier.9" Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that subsequent cases that
resemble prior panel decisions will most likely lead to a decision in favor of free trade, and
against environmental protection measures.
B.

UnderNAFTA Itself

As discussed above, a dispute may be resolved under either GATT or NAFTA.' 2 In a
dispute as to whether an environmental regulation constitutes a trade barrier under NAFTA,
the chapters containing environmental or ecological components are of particular importance
in determining the outcome of the dispute.93 For this reason, this Comment discusses the
following chapters of NAFTA: Chapter 6 on energy and petrochemical goods, chapter 7 on
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and chapter 9 on standards-related measures.94
However, before an analysis of these chapters is conducted, it is useful to understand how
the dispute resolution process functions under NAFTA.
1. NAFTA Dispute Resolution Process
NAFTA creates a Free Trade Commission that supervises the implementation of
NAFTA and resolves disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application of
the agreement." Under NAFTA there are a number of steps a complaining party must
follow in order to challenge another party's regulation as inconsistent with the agreement.
First, a complaining party may request consultations with another party regarding any actual
or proposed measure that may affect the operation of NAFTA.96 Pursuant to article 2006,
the parties shall make every attempt to reach a satisfactory resolution.97 If this first step
fails, then the parties may request a meeting of the Commission.98 The Commission will
create a report that contains recommendations for an appropriate solution.9 9 If the
Commission convenes but the issue is not resolved within thirty days, then the parties may
request that the Commission establish a dispute panel.te e
The dispute panel is composed of five members chosen from a roster established by the
parties and having expertise or experience in the law, international trade, or other matters

strike at a host of environmental laws).
91. Petersmann, supra note 36, at 65.
92. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing in more
detail which dispute settlement procedures a party can select).
93. See NAFTA, supra note 5, chs. 6, 7B & 9.
94. See id. chs. 6, 7B, & 9. These three chapters are the main chapters that encompass environmental
concerns and regulations.
95. Id. art. 2001. The Free Trade Conunission is comprised of cabinet-level representatives from each
signatory country or their designees. Id. The Commission oversees further elaboration of the agreement,
supervises the work of all committees and working groups established under NAFTA, and considers other
matters that may affect the operation of NAFTA. Id. art. 2001(2). The Commission may establish and delegate

responsibilities to working or expert groups, seek the advice of nongovernmental persons, and take such other
action to exercise its functions as the parties agree. Id. art. 2001(3).
96. Id. art. 2006(l).
97. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2006(5).

98. Id. art. 2007.
99. Id. art. 2007.
100. Id. art. 2008.
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covered by the agreement." 1 The panel will make an initial report stating its findings and
recommendations for settlement and within thirty days it shall present its final report, unless
the parties otherwise agree."°e Once a final report is made, the parties are required to agree
on a resolution of the dispute."0 3
2.

EnvironmentalStandardsFound Within NAFTA: Are They Clear?

The provisions of NAFTA contain many standards and procedures that the parties are
0
required to follow."ee Many of these standards are ambiguous and give little guidance.
Despite the ambiguities, interpretation of the provisions is vital to understanding whether a
U.S. environmental regulation is a trade barrier under NAFTA. The following subsections
discuss the standards found within NAFTA and their bearing on this issue.
a.

Chapters 1 and 3 Standards

The first few chapters of NAFTA establish general guidelines and set forth the
objectives of the agreement.'*6 The main objectives of NAFTA are to eliminate barriers
to trade and to facilitate the cross border movement of goods and services between the
parties. 7 These two goals are first addressed in chapter 3, which institutes a universal rule
to govern all trade between the parties." 8 This rule provides that each party shall "accord
national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance with article III of
[GATT]."'0 9 In addition, article 309 institutes a basic rule pertaining to non-tariff
measures that states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, no Party shall adopt
or maintain any prohibition or restriction on the importation... or on the exportation... of

101. Id. arts. 200-11.
102. NAFTA, supra note 5, arts. 2016-17.
103. Id. art. 2018. See infra notes 237-243 and accompanying text (setting forth a more detailed discussion
of the effects of a panel decision).
104. See NAFTA supra note 5, art. 105.
105. See, e.g., id. art. 754(5), annex 2004. For example, article 754 uses the wording "necessary to achieve
its appropriate level of protection" to ensure that measures do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, and
annex 2004 states that i order to determine whether a contracting party can have recourse under NAFTA the
panel must determine whether the complaining party's "benefit" is "nullified or impaired- by the regulation. Id.
106. Id chs. 1-3. Specifically, chapter 2 sets forth the general definitions of NAFIA and for purposes of
this comment will not be discussed. Id. ch. 2.
107. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 102. Article 102 provides:
The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules,
including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency are to:
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement of, goods and
services between the territories of the Parties;
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories;
(d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights in each Party's territory;
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this
Agreement, and for its joint administration and the resolution of disputes; and
(t) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to
expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
Id.
108. See id at. 301.
109. Id. art. 301.
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any good... except in accordance with article XI of [GATT]... .- 'to Chapter 3 reiterates
many of the same basic standards as found in GATT, thus providing a foundation upon
which the remainder of NAFTA is based."t
b.

Chapter6 Standards

Furthering the rules set forth in chapter 3, chapter 6 reaffirms the parties obligations to
all the provisions of GATT with respect to prohibitions and restrictions on trade in the area
of energy and petrochemical goods.1 2 Specifically, article 605 states that a party may
maintain an export restriction justified under GATT article XX(g)" 3 only if the restriction
meets three requirements. 14 The first two requirements restrict standards by identifying
economic and trade considerations as limitations.' 5 However, allowing trade and
economic factors to play a role in determining whether environmental concerns justify
certain restrictive measures will likely result in detrimental effects on the environment." 6
This result is due to the likelihood that trade and economic burdens will greatly outweigh
environmental interests." 7 Although article 605 allows regulations justified on the basis
of environmental concerns, the third requirement tends to facilitate free trade by limiting
' 8
environmental justifications to those that do not disrupt the "normal channels of supply.""
But what is a "normal channel of supply?" NAFTA provides no definition but, logically, the

110. Id. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (for a discussion of article XI of GATI).
111. Compare NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 301, 309 with GATI, supra note 15, art. 1M,XI.
112. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 603.
113. GA 1Tsupra note 15, art. XX. Section XX(g) is an exception that allows a party to maintain or adopt
measures that relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources even though they may otherwise be
inconsistent with GAT. Id. The adoption of such a measure is limited to measures which do not constitute a
means of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or create a disguised restriction on trade. Id. See also supra
notes 54, 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's article XX and the interpretation of article XX(g)).
114. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 605. Article 605 provides:
A Party may maintain or introduce a restriction otherwise justified under the provisions of Article
...XX(g) ... of GATr with respect to the export of an energy or basic petrochemical good to the
territory of another Party, only if:
(a) the restriction does not reduce the proportion of the total export shipments of a
specific energy or basic petrochemical good made available to such other Party
relative to the total supply of that good of the Party maintaining the restriction[.]
(b)

the Party does not impose a higher price for exports of an energy or basic
petrochemical good to such other Party than the price charged for such energy good
when consumed domestically[.] ...

(c)

and

the restriction does not require the disruption of normal channels of supply to such
other Party....

Id.
115. Id.
116. See Seymour J. Rubin, A Predominantly Commercial Policy Perspective, in ENVIRONMENT AND
TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENvIRONMENTAL POLICY 3, 3-16 (Seymour J. Rubin
& Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982) (discussing trade effects on the environment).
117. NAFTA: CongressIssues, supra note 16, at 13. Due to the nature of a free trade agreement such as
NAFTA, the vast majority of trade restrictions are likely to result in heavy economic burdens. Id. For example,
in 1989, exports from Mexico and Canada exceeded $100 billion. Id.
118. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 605.
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term "normal" incorporates a wide range of trade activities." 9 Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that many U.S. environmental regulations will fall within the scope of article
605's restrictions and subject the regulations to review under NAFTA.
Although NAFTA was created to eliminate barriers to trade by establishing various
standards and restrictions to govern trade between the parties, NAFTA also establishes
certain exceptions to these rules.' One exception is found in chapter 6 (annex 602.3).ut

It gives Mexico the right to certain strategic activities and investments such as exploration
and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, foreign trade, transportation, storage and

distribution, and fi:rst hand sales of such goods as crude oil, natural and artificial gas, and
basic petrochemicals. 2 2 On its face, NAFTA permits Mexico to engage in a wide range
of possible activities extending from the production and extraction stage of oil and gas to the
distribution and sale of the end product. 123 The broad wording of annex 602.3 gives

Mexico the right to engage in activities that have a detrimental effect on the environment
without having to conform to the standards of NAFTA.'2 However, it is not clear whether
a panel would interpret the scope of annex 602.3 narrowly or more broadly than its language
indicates. There are no analogous interpretations under GATT from which to compare and,
although the language of annex 602.3 suggests a broad application of the exception, it is
difficult to determine exactly how far a panel is likely to go with a decision until this issue
is litigated.
c.

Chapter7B Standards

Chapter 7 subsection B is the second major section of NAFTA relating to environmental
matters.12 5 This chapter applies to any sanitary or phytosanitary (SPS) measure that

119. Established trade "channels" do not exist from which to determine normalcy since NAFTA creates
a new trade area.
120. See NAFTA, supra note 5, annexes 301.3, 316, & 602.3.
121. Id. annex 602.3. Annex 602.3(1) provides:
The Mexican State reserves to itself the following strategic activities and investment in such
activities:
(a) exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas; refining or processing of
crude oil and natural gas; production of artificial gas, basic petrochemicals and their
feedstocks; and pipelines; and ,
(b) foreign trade; transportation, storage and distribution, up to and including first hand
sales of the following goods: crude oil; natural gas; goods covered by this Chapter
obtain-A from the refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas; and basic
petrocliemicals.
Id.
122. Id. annex 6(12.3. "Foreign trade" as used in annex 602.3 broadly encompasses foreign trade in crude
oil, natural gas, goods obtained from the refining process of crude oil and natural gas, and basic petrochemicals.
Id.
123. Id.
124. See NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 602.3.
125. Id. art. 766. Article 766 provides:
[S]anitary or phytosanitary measure means a measure that a party adopts, maintains or applies to:
(a) protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising from the
introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or diseases,
(b) protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks arising from the
presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-causing organism in a food,
beverage or feedstuff ....
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directly or indirectly affects trade between the parties.12 6 Because the word "indirectly" has
such a broad connotation, chapter 7B has the potential of facilitating the incorporation of a
wide array of U.S. environmental regulations into NAFTA. 7 This is true even though a
regulation may have a legitimate purpose of conserving or protecting
the environment and
28
in no way is intended to directly act as a restraint on trade.
Nevertheless, article 754(2) allows a party the discretion to: (1) create SPS measures
designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; and (2) use a risk assessment to
establish the appropriate level of protection.129 However, article 754(3) specifically
requires that any SPS measure that a party adopts be "based on a risk assessment, as
appropriate to the circumstances." 130 These two articles conflict since article 754(3)
requires a risk assessment and article 754(2) states that a risk assessment is only
discretionary. 3 1 Consequently, it is unclear which of these two articles will govern. If a
panel convened under NAFTA takes prior GATT panel rulings into account, 3 2 then a
conflict between whether a risk assessment is discretionary or mandatory will likely lead to
a narrower interpretation of articles 754(2) and (3).133 But until the issue is litigated there
is no way to definitely determine which provision will govern.
Assuming that a risk assessment is required, a party must determine what factors to
consider in making its assessment. In assessing the risk associated with establishing an SPS
measure, each party is required, under article 757, to consider relevant methodologies,
techniques, and scientific evidence.134 In addition, each party must consider economic
factors, such as the cost effectiveness of alternative approaches and the loss of production
that may result from the introduction of a pest or disease. 35 When economic factors are
considered in determining issues regarding trade and its effect on the environment, the
outcome is likely to favor free trade rather than environmental protection. 3 6 This is

including end product criteria; a product-related processing or production method; a testing,
inspection, certification or approval procedure; a relevant statistical method; a sampling procedure;
a method of risk assessment; a packaging and labelling requirement directly related to food safety;
and a quarantine treatment, such as a relevant requirement associated with the transportation of
animals or plants or with material necessary for their survival during transportation ....

Id.
126. Id. art. 751.
127. Id ch. 7B.
128. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 751 (discussing the purposes of sanitary and phytosanitary measures).
See also Rubin, supra note 116, at 4 (stating that some measures may have legitimate environmental goals, but
nevertheless have restrictive trade effects).
129. NAFTA, supra note 5, arts. 754(2), (3). Article 766 provides:
[R]isk assessment means an evaluation of:
(a) the potential for the introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease and
associated biological and economic consequences; or
(b) the potential for adverse effects on human or animal life or health arising from the

presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-causing organism in a food,
beverage or feedstuff[.] ...
Id. art. 766.
130. Id. art. 754(3).
131. Id art. 754(2), (3).
132. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text (discussing how prior GATT panels have decided the
trade barrier issue and the tendency for panels to narrowly interpret the language of GATI).
133. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing prior GATT panel rulings).
134. NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 757.
135. Id art. 757(2).
136. See Rubin, supra note 116, 3-16 (discussing trade effects on the environment).
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especially true where the effect of environmental regulations results in a substantial
economic deficit. 37
If an SPS measure is currently in effect, then a separate set of rules apply. Article 754
establishes a set of standards pertaining to basic rights and obligations of the parties.' 38
Section 4 of article 754 creates a nondiscrimination clause requiring that any SPS measure
adopted or maintained shall not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against goods of
another party. 139 Section 5, entitled unnecessary obstacles, requires that any SPS measure
that a party adopts or maintains shall "apply only to the extent necessary to achieve its
appropriate level of protection." 40 Application of section 5 requires a determination of
the term "necessary." Logically, this implicates considering the circumstances surrounding
the adoption or maintenance of an SPS measure and any appropriate alternatives available.
If alternatives exist, then it is likely that a measure adopted by the parties is not necessary
and thus is inconsistent with the requirements of article 754(5). '41
Such a finding was made by the GATT panel regarding the United States' embargo on
tuna from Mexico. 142 The panel found that because the United States did not exhaust all
options reasonably available, the embargo did not meet the necessity requirement of article
XX(b) of GATT.'43 If a similar issue is presented to a panel convened under NAFTA it is
when interpreting the meaning of
likely that the panel would follow this same reasoning
"necessary" within article 754(5) of NAFrA. 44
In addition to interpreting the term necessary, article 754(5) also requires determining
what is meant by art "appropriate level" of protection. Article 754(5) states that technical and
economic feasibility are factors that the parties must consider when determining what an
appropriate level of protection encompasses. 41 This leaves open the question of what type
of economic factors a party must consider. Logically, such considerations include whether
it is economically feasible for a party to maintain or adopt an SPS measure and the trade
effects that may occur as the result of such an adoption. Nonetheless, the language of article
754(5) is ambigucus and until the issue is considered by a NAFTA panel, interpretation
remains speculative.
Another ambiguous section is article 754(6) which prohibits a party from adopting an
SPS measure with the "view to, or with the effect of creating a disguised restriction to
trade." 46 A disguised restriction is generally a regulation that is applied to an import to
benefit domestic products under the fake auspices of a more legitimate concern. 147 This

137. See Charles Pearson, Environment and International Economic Policy, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADe:
THE REI.ATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 46, 48-53 (Seymour J. Rubin &
Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982) (providing further discussion of trade effects on the environment).
138. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 754.
139. Id art. 754(4).
140. Id art. 754(5).
141. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (referring to a GATT panel ruling that found that the
term "necessary" requires determining whether there were other alternative options available).
142. U.S. Tuna Restrictions, supra note 34, at 1598.

143.
144.
12, 1992)
145.
146.
147.

U.S. Tuna Prohibitions,supra note 34, at 105-09.
See Different Views Expressed on NAFTA Dispute Resolution, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2135 (Dec.
(discussing dispute resolution under NAFTA).
NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 754(5).
Id. art. 754(6).
See Rubin, supra note 116, at 7-11 (discussing environmental measures as disguised trade barriers).
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means that even though a regulation has a legitimate purpose ofprotecting the
environment,
148
if it creates the effect of a "disguised restriction" then it violates NAFTA.
L

Chapter9 Standards

A major goal of NAFTA is to eliminate all trade barriers over a span of fifteen
years.149 This includes eliminating technical barriers to trade and is governed specifically
by Part 3 of NAFTA. 50 Part 3 includes only chapter 9 and deals specifically with
standards-related measures.' 5 ' The scope of chapter 9 incorporates any standards-related
measure that may directly or indirectly affect trade in goods.'52 The wording is comparable
to that found in chapter 7B but since the definition of a standards-related measure is likely
to encompass many types ofSPS measures, chapter 9 is broader in its overall application and
presumably facilitates the incorporation of a greater array of environmental standards into
NAFTA than chapter 7B.11 3 For instance, any regulation that governs product
characteristics, production methods, or related processes fits within the definition of article
901 and is subject to the standards and strictures of chapter 9.154
Article 904 provides a set of obligations and standards for the parties to follow that are
similar to those found in chapter 7B.'55 The first provision of this article allows each party
to adopt and maintain standards-related measures for the purpose of protecting animal and
plant life and health, including the environment, as long as it is in accordance with the
agreement. 5 6 Therefore, in order to properly adopt or maintain an environmental
regulation, it is necessary to determine what chapter 9 requires.

148. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 754. See U.S. Auto Imports, supra note 34, at 125 (stating that it is the
application of the measure and not the measure itself that needed to be examined when determining whether a
measure is a "disguised restriction"); Rubin, supra note 116, at 3-4 (stating that a measure may have a legitimate
justification but nevertheless have trade distortive effects).
149. GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, UNITED MEXICAN STATES, AND THE U.S., DESCRIPTION OF THE
PROPOSED NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 (Aug. 12, 1992) (provided by the U.S. Trade
Department).
150. NAFTA, supra note 5, pt. 3.
151. Id. art. 915. Article 915 provides:
[S]tandard means a document, approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products, or related processes and production
methods, or for services or related operating methods with which compliance is not mandatory. It
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production or operating method[.] ...
[S]tandards-related measure means a standard, technical regulation or conformity assessment
procedure[.] ...
[Tiechnical regulation means a document which lays down product characteristics of their related
processes and production methods, or for services or operating methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply
to a product, process or production or operating method[.] ...
Ia.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. art. 901.
See id. (discussing the scope of standards-related measures).
NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 901.
Id. art. 904.
Id. art. 904(1).
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Article 904(2) establishes the first of the rules governing the right to establish a level of
protection regarding human, animal, and plant life."5 7 This provision allows a party to
establish a level of protection that it considers appropriate if it complies with article 907(3),
which governs risk: assessment procedures." 8 Article 904(2), similar to article 754(2),'
gives a party the discretion to establish the levels of protection that the party considers
appropriate if it conducts a risk assessment of the measure.' 60 In the absence of a more
concrete definition of "risk assessment," 6 1 just about any study or cost benefit analysis
that evaluates the effectiveness of a particular regulation arguably fits within the definition.
Therefore, even though a party does not intentionally conduct a "risk assessment," if the
actions of the party are considered within the definition, then a regulation is subject to the
requirements of 907(3).162
Article 907(3) specifically states that where a party establishes a level of protection that
it considers appropriate and conducts a risk assessment, the regulation must avoid arbitrary
and unjustified discrimination against goods and it must not constitute a disguised restriction
on trade, or discriminate between similar goods. 63 Therefore, a determination that a party
has performed a risk assessment may expose U.S. environmental regulations to attack
regarding the necessity for such standards.'" However, the wording of article 907 does not
specifically indicate what affect the risk assessment is supposed to have regarding the
creation and implementation of regulations and standards. 16' Article 907 only specifies
what a party may consider when conducting a risk assessment, but contains no guidance on
how the risk assessment effects the adoption or maintenance of a regulation.'
In the absence of a measure falling within the parameters of article 907(3), which
prohibits discriminatory standards, a standards-related measure still must not treat goods of
another party less favorably than it treats like goods of any other country., 67 Similar
language is found throughout GATT168 and has generated controversy regarding the
meaning of "like product" in the context of the different articles in which it is found. 6 9

157.

lat art. 904(2).

158.

Id.

159. See supra, notes 129-33 and accompanying text (discussing article 754(2)).
160.

NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 904(2).

161. Id. art. 915. Article 915 defines risk assessment as an evaluation of the potential for adverse effects.
Id
162.
163.

Id. art. 907.
Id art. 907(3).

164. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 907 (discussing assessment of risk).
165.
166.
167.

See id
See id.
See id art. 904(3).

168. See GAT', supra note 15, art. I (establishing the most-favored-nation clause which prohibits
discrimination between goods from different exporting countries).
169. See WORLD TRADE! AND GATF, supra note 15, at 259-64; WORLD TRADING SYsTEM, supranote 15,
at 138 (discussing "like products" in detail). Articles III, IV, V, IX, XIII, XVII, XVIII and XX contain
nondiscrimination clauses which are generally known as the Most-Favored Nation obligations (MFN). WORLD
TRADE AND GATT, supra note 15, at 255. See, e.g., Australian Subsidy, supra note 34, at 188 (finding that
ammonium sulphate and sodium nitrate are not like products because they are usually classified as separate tariff
items); Brazilian Internal Taxes, supra note 34, at 181 (concluding that domestic cognac from Brazil and
imported cognac are not like products because they contain different ingredients).
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Presumably, the same treatment could occur under NAFTA because the only difference in
170
language is the use of the phrase "like goods" rather than "like products."
In addition to the prohibition on less favorable treatment, article 904 also prohibits
standards-related measures if they create an unnecessary obstacle to trade.17' The wording
of article 904(4) specifically indicates that regardless of whether a standard purposely
creates, or merely has the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade, the standard
is inconsistent with NAFTA. 72 What is meant by an "unnecessary obstacle" to trade?
Article 904(4) does not provide a specific definition of what "unnecessary obstacle" is, but
rather provides what it is not.'73
There are two requirements to meet before a measure is deemed not to create an
unnecessary obstacle to trade. 7 4 The first requirement is that the purpose of the measure
is to achieve a legitimate objective. 175 The second requirement provides that the measure
shall not operate to exclude goods of another party which meet that legitimate objective. 76
Examples of legitimate objectives are defined by article 915; however, as the language
indicates, the list is not exhaustive." In connection with determining the legitimacy of an
objective, the definition points out several factors to consider. 78 The most problematical
factor is phrased as "other things," which subsequently leads to a broad interpretation of
possible factors that are appropriate to consider. 79 For example, these "other things" can
include economic effects as well as trade considerations.' 80 In light of the definition,
presumably a party is required to weigh and consider these "other things" in determining
legitimacy, even though protection of animal or plant life is listed as an example of a

170. NAFTA, supra note 5,arts. 754(4), 904(3). The language "like goods" is found in articles 754(4) and
904(3). Id.
171. Id art. 904(4).
172. Id Article 904(4) provides:
No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure with a view to or with
the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between the Parties. An unnecessary obstacle
to trade shall not be deemed to be created if:
(a) the demonstrable purpose of such measure is to achieve a legitimate objective; and
(b) such measure does not operate to exclude goods of another Party that meet that
legitimate objective.
Id
173. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 904(4).
174. Id

175. Id art. 904(4)(a).
176. Id. art. 904(4)(b). This second requirement ensures that a party's regulation does not exclude goods
of another party that otherwise satisfy the legitimate objective of that regulation. Id.
177. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 915. Article 915 provides:
[L]egitimate objective includes an objective such as:

(a) safety;
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers
(including matters relating to quality and identifiability of goods or services); or
(c) sustainable development,
considering, among other things, where appropriate, fundamental climatic or other geographical

factors, technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific justifications but does not include the
protection of domestic production[.] ...
Id

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. (discussing legitimate objectives). Despite the use of the phrase other things as a factor, article
915 specifically excludes any consideration of the protection of domestic production in deciding legitimacy. Id.
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legitimate objective.' If the application of a regulation leads to a negative impact on the
economy or trade of another party, then the regulation's objective may be outweighed by
these other negative effects and result in an objective that is not legitimate under
NAFTA. 82
In light of the preceding discussion, article 905 requires that international standards act
as the basis for all standards-related measures unless the international standard is ineffective
or inappropriate to fulfill the legitimate objective of a measure.' 83 This may create
problems for ihe U.S. in the future if it plans to create new environmental regulations that
are stricter than international standards. In order to overcome this requirement a party has
to successfully argue two points. First, a party must show that it has a legitimate
objective.' 84 Second, the international standard must be ineffective or inappropriate to
fulfill the party's legitimate objective. 8 ' Although article 905 does not provide a definition
of ineffective or inappropriate, these terms logically involve a weighing and balancing of
considerations to assess whether a given international standard is a proper and suitable means
of accomplishing a party's objective.
3.

Can a U.S. EnvironmentalRegulation be Viewed as a Restrictionon Trade Under
NAFTA?

Many environmental groups are concerned that NAFTA will subject U.S. environmental
regulations to attack as trade barriers. 186 Once a regulation is considered a restraint on
trade, it is likely that such a regulation will violate either NAFIA or GATT. 8 ' Therefore,
it is important to determine how vulnerable environmental regulations are to such an attack.
This section examines the standards and restrictions of chapters 6, 7B, and 9 of NAFTA to
determine the likelihood that a U.S. environmental regulation will constitute a trade
barrier. 8'
If an environmental regulation deals with energy or petrochemical goods then it will
likely fall within the scope of chapter 6.289 Once within chapter 6, a regulation is subject
to the standards and rules of that chapter. For example, article 605 governs the maintenance
of export restrictions and states that such a restriction will not constitute a trade barrier if it
meets several requirements. 9 First, a party may maintain a restriction that is otherwise

181. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 915.
182. I'4 arts. 904(4), 915.
183. Id. art. 905. In general, NAFTA tends to lean toward a harmonization of standards between the
parties. Id; Reilly Conference, supra note 6.
184. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of what legitimate objective
means).
185. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 905. Article 905 suggests that a party can adopt measures that are at a
higher level than its international counterpart if it conforms to the requirements of the provision. Id.
186. NAFTA Falls Short, supra note 9, at 1502; Citizens Blast, supra note 9, at 1730-3 1.
187. Note that GATr article XI effectively prohibits quantitative restrictions, i.e. non-tariff barriers. GATT,
supra note 15, art. XL NAFTA has a similar restriction that prohibits a party from maintaining restrictions on
imports and exports unless it conforms to article XI of GAIT. NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 309.
188. A U.S. entironmental regulation may also be challenged as a trade barrier under other chapters of
NAFTA but for purposes of this comment only chapters 6, 7B, and 9 are discussed.
189. See NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 6 (discussing energy and basic petrochemical regulations).
190. Id. art. 605. Note that article 605 pertains only to export restrictions. Id. See supra notes 112-19 and
accompanying text (discussing the standards of article 605).
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justified under GATT article XX(g). 9 ' This means that the regulation must relate to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources."92 However, such a regulation may be
maintained only if it does not restrict the total proportion of export shipments of a specific
energy, disrupt the normal channels of supply, and impose a higher price for exported goods
than those consumed domestically.' 93 Assuming a party can successfully challenge a
regulation by showing that it does not meet one of these limitations, then regardless of
whether it is justified under article XX(g) of GATT, the regulation will violate NAFTA and
is subject to the dispute settlement provisions of chapter 20.'9'
In addition to the above, chapter 6 also contains an exception which may allow Mexico
to successfully argue that a U.S. environmental regulation is a trade barrier and in violation
of NAFTA. 95 This may be accomplished by showing that a regulation infringes upon one
of the strategic activities and investments reserved to Mexico under annex 602.3.96
Because annex 602.3 covers such a wide range ofactivities, there is an increased possibility
that a U.S. environmental regulation will fall prey to annex 602.3 and constitute a trade
barrier.
Although chapter 6 contains language which allows a party to adopt measures that are
designed to protect the environment, it also contains language that restricts the ability to
develop such standards. 197 Rather than improving the maintenance of environmental
regulations, chapter 6 tends to hinder the ability of the U.S. to successfully regulate
environmental interests that relate to energy or petrochemical goods, because the broad and
ambiguous wording of chapter 6 leans toward facilitating a ruling in favor of free trade.198
In addition to chapter 6, an environmental regulation may hqve to conform to chapter
7B of NAFTA. A regulation is governed by chapter 7B if it pertains to SPS measures.' 99
Assuming that a party challenges a U.S. environmental regulation as a trade barrier under
chapter 7B, a panel will determine the basic rights and obligation of the parties pursuant to
article 754.2"' Article 754 ensures that nondomestic products are treated in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, that SPS measures are applied only to the extent necessary, and
that any SPS measure adopted or maintained does not create a disguised restriction on
trade.2° '
1

191. NAFrA, supra note 5, art 605. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirement that in order for a country's regulation to be justified under GAT article XX(g) it must regulate
only within the jurisdiction of that country).
192. See GAIT, supra note 15, art. XX(g).
193. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 605.
194. Id See infra notes 225-243 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA's dispute resolution

requirements).
195.

See NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 602.3. See supra notes 12 1-24 and accompanying text (discussing

the exception created in annex 602.3).
196. See NAFrA, supra note 5, Annex 602.3 (discussing Mexican strategic activities).
197. See id art. 605 (stating that a party may maintain a regulation otherwise justified under article XX(g)
of GAIT only if it satisfies three requirements).
198. See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text (discussing chapter 6).
199. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 751.
200. Id art. 754 (setting forth the basic rights and obligations under chapter 7B).

201. See id
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Article 7 5 4 (4 )20' contains language similar to that found in article M of GATT which
imposes a national treatment obligation and requires nondiscrimination between imported
and domestic products." 3 Because these two provisions are similar, it is likely that a
dispute panel under NAFTA will follow the lead of prior GATT panel rulings and interpret
the analogous provisions in a similar manner.2° If this is the case, then any SPS measure
that applies unequally to imported goods and like domestic goods will violate the
nondiscriminatory obligation under NAFTA. 2°5
In addition to prohibiting discriminatory treatment oflike goods, article 754 also ensures
that any SPS measure that a party applies, extends only to what is necessary to achieve an
appropriate level of protection.2° This allows a complaining party to argue that a given
measure is unnecessary to achieve a given level of protection. A NAFTA panel considering
such a challenge may take into account prior GATT panel rulings to help interpret the
meaning of "necessary." 20 7 However, prior GATT panel rulings have interpreted
"necessary" only as it pertains to article XX(b) of GATT 2 °' and therefore "necessary" as
it applies in other contexts may have a different interpretation under NAFTA. Despite this
potential difference it is likely that a NAFTA panel will follow the prior GATT panel's
2
pattern of strictly and narrowly interpreting such provisions, " in which case the use of an
environmental regulation that may have alternative options available will constitute a trade
barrier.210
An environmental regulation may also come under attack if it has the effect of creating
a disguised restriction on trade. 21" Following a GATT panel ruling in 1983, a NAFTA
22
panel must look at the way a measure is applied and not at the measure itself. Therefore,

202. Id art. 754(4). Article 754(4) of NAFrA provides:
Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains or applies
does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between its goods and like goods of another Party,
or between goods of another Party and like goods of any other country, where identical or similar
conditions prevail. i[d
203. See GATT, spra note 15, art. 111(4) Article 111(4) provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products
of national origin i respect to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use....
Id. See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum,AGORA: Tradeand Environment:FreeInternationalTrade and Protection
of the Environment: IrreconcilableConflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 707 (1992) (stating that article 1(4) of
GAiT applies broadly under all governmental requirements and regulations such that any measure that applies
unequally to imported products and like domestic products violates the national treatment obligation).
204. See, e.g., U.S. Petroleum Taxes, supra note 34, 136 (determining whether a tax on imported products
meets the national treatment requirement of article 11(2) of GAIT, the panel found that it depends upon whether
like domestic products axe taxed, directly or indirectly, at the same or higher rate.) Therefore, GATr panel held
that a U.S. tax imposed on imported oil that was greater than the charge for domestically produced oil violated
GATT. Id.
205. Schoenbauip, supra note 203, at 708. See NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 754(4).
206. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 754(5).
207. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of the word "necessary"
under GATr).
208. See id
209. See Schoenbaum, supra note 203, at 700; Beacham, supra note 73, at 663 (providing an analysis of
the GAIT panel's pattern of strict interpretations).
210. U.S. Tuna Restrictions, supra note 34, at 1598.
211. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 754(6).
212. See U.S. Auto Imports, supra note 34, at 107.
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if a U.S. environmental regulation is applied such that its effect creates a disguised
restriction, then it will violate article 754(6) of NAFTA. 13
Finally, a party may challenge a U.S. environmental regulation within the constraints
of chapter 9."4 Under article 904, which pertains to basic rights and obligations, a party
is required to "accord to goods of another party treatment no less favorable than that it
accords like goods" of other countries. 21 5 If a U.S. environmental regulation is challenged
under this provision, a complaining party may have a difficult time proving that the restricted
goods are similar enough to the goods of other countries so that they are considered "like
goods" within the meaning of article 904(3).216 Accordingly, if the goods in dispute are not
considered "like goods," then the regulation does not have to treat those goods with equal
force. 1 7 This may allow the U.S. to establish environmental regulations that restrict
importation in a discriminatory manner. However, such regulations must nevertheless
comply with each of the requirements of chapter 9.
In conjunction with article 904(3), article 904(4) prohibits regulations that have the
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to trade unless the regulation has a "legitimate
objective.""' However, an environmental regulation may not have a legitimate objective
if such factors as economic effects or protection of domestic production are considered.219
Accordingly, a regulation without a legitimate objective that has the effect of creating an
unnecessary obstacle to trade, is in violation of NAFTA.22 ° But, until this issue is litigated
22
it is difficult to determine the likelihood of such a finding. '
In addition to the above obligations, chapter 9 preserves a party's right to choose a
regulation's level ofprotection and conduct a risk assessment to ensure an appropriate level
is achieved.' However, once a risk assessment is conducted, an environmental regulation
is subject to challenge under article 907 which requires that a regulation avoid constituting
disguised restrictions on trade and arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminating against goods
of another party.2 s Assuming that a risk assessment is conducted, a complaining party has
the added opportunity to use article 907 to its advantage by arguing that the responding party
failed to meet the two requirements of the article.
In summary, chapters 6, 7B, and 9 provide a complaining party with ample opportunity
to challenge a U.S. environmental regulation as a restriction on trade. This is due in large
part to the use of ambiguous language. But despite the fact that there are numerous ways in

213. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 754(6).
214. lad art. 901. Chapter 9 applies to any standards-related measure. Id. See supra notes 149-85 and
accompanying text (discussing the standards of chapter 9).
215. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 904(3)(b).
216. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (discussing "like goods" under NAFTA and the
conflict generated under GATT concerning the phrase "like products").
217. NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 904(3).
218. Id. art. 904(4).
219. Id. art. 904. See also supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (describing what factors are
considered in determining a legitimate objective).
220. Id. arts. 904(4), 915.
221. The main problem concerns the meaning of "legitimate" because what one country deems legitimate
may be excessive by another. Hans van Houtte, Health and Safety Regulations in InternationalTrade, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 128, 134 n.25 (Petar Sarcevic & Hans van Houtte eds., 1990).

222.

See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 904(2). See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discussing

the risk assessment procedures).
223.

Id art. 907.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 6
which to challenge an environmental regulation, until these ambiguities are litigated, it is
difficult to determine the likelihood that any one of these methods will succeed.
IV. NAFrA'S EFFECT ON U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS

This section discusses how NAFTA will detrimentally affect the enforcement of U.S.
environmental regulations by first explaining how panel decisions are implemented and
resolved. Implementation and resolution of disputes under NAFTA is governed by chapter
224
20 and contains language that will facilitate the lowering of environmental standards.
The second part of this section focuses on the loopholes in NAFTA and what type of effect
they will have.
A.

Resolution and Implementation ofa PanelRuling

Chapter 20, which governs dispute settlement procedures, will have the greatest impact
on how NAFTA is implemented. 225 This chapter deals specifically with resolution
procedures and mechanisms, the rules pertaining to the establishment of dispute panels,
settlement of disputes, and implementation of a panel's findings.226
Chapter 20 does not establish specific standards with respect to determining whether a
regulation is a trade barrier; instead it governs the resolution and implementation of
disputes.227 Under chapter 20 a party can choose to have their disputes governed either
under NAFTA itself or under GATT. 228 This determination is essentially for the
complaining party to decide. 29 As a result, it creates a choice of law provision in which
230
the complaining party has the opportunity to have the least restrictive agreement apply.
However, chapter 20 also allows a responding party to have the dispute settled solely under
NAFTA, provided the dispute arises under chapter 7B or 9.231 Therefore, if a dispute arises
under chapter 6, the complaining party essentially has the ability to pick whichever
agreement is most beneficial to its position.
Under chapter 20 a party can bring a dispute before the Free Trade Commission and if
settlement is not achieved, the parties can request the establishment of a panel to make
findings and recommendations for settlement.232 Annex 2004 is of particular importance.
It contains langurge that indicates a party may have recourse to dispute settlement even if
a regulation is entirely consistent with the provisions of NAFTA. 2" All that a complaining
party must show is that the challenged regulation nullifies or impairs a benefit that the

224. See i. ch. 20.
225. L See supra notes 95-103 (discussing the process of bringing a dispute under NAFTA).
226. NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 20.
227. Id
228. Id. art. 2005.
229. Id. art. 2005(l).
230. Id One criticism of the dispute resolution process under GAIT is that it places the burden of proof
on the party trying to defend an environmental law, whereas under NAFTA the burden is placed on the
challenging party. U.S., Mexico and Canada Plan to Establish Trade Commission, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1329 (Aug. 5, 1992).
231. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005(4).
232. See id ch. 20. See also supra notes 95-103 (discussing how a party brings forth a complaint).
233. NAFrA, supra note 5, annex 2004.
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complaining party could reasonably have expected to accrue to it under either chapter 6234
or chapter 9.235 In effect, this allows a party to challenge a U.S. environmental regulation
that is entirely consistent with the agreement and still receive recourse.236
Once a panel makes its findings and recommendations, the inquiry is not over. The issue
now becomes one of enforcement. What are the parties to do with the decision? Article
2018(1) deals with implementing the panel's report and states that the parties shall agree on
a resolution of the dispute which normally shall conform to the findings and
recommendations of the panel.'sl In addition, section (2) suggests that the resolution shall,
whenever possible, direct the "non-implementation or removal" of a regulation that fails to
conform to NAFTA or causes nullification or impairment.238 Although this section does
not require the non-implementation or removal of a regulation, the alternative solutions may
2 39
provide no other acceptable resolution of the dispute.
One alternative involves compensation if a party fails to abide by the nonimplementation or removal recommendation.240 However, compensation could range
beyond what a party is willing to pay, especially since a dispute under NAFTA is likely to
involve large quantities of trade in goods, resulting in excessive damages."4 Consequently,
if the parties fail to reach a satisfactory resolution, the aggrieved party may suspend any
benefits from the party at fault as long as the suspended benefits have an equivalent effect

234. Id. ch. 6. An impaired benefit claimed under chapter 6 must relate to a provision that deals with
investment. Id. annex 2004.
235. Id, ch. 9. Other provisions that also apply to this annex include part two (Trade in Goods), except
for the provisions of annex 300-A dealing with the Automotive Sector, chapter 12 (Cross-Boarder Trade in
Services), and part six (Intellectual Property). Id. The "nullification and impairment" language in chapter 20 of
NAFTA is also found in GAT1 article XXII. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIII. See generally Petersmann,supra
note 36, at 65-66 (discussing in detail how article XXII is applied under GATI.
236. See NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 2004, annex 2004.
237. Id, art. 2018(1). Article 2018 provides:
I.
On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of
the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the
panel ....
2.
Whenever possible, such resolution shall be non-implementation or removal of a measure not
conforming with this Agreement or causing nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex
2004 or, failing such a resolution, compensation.
Id. art. 2018. Annex 2004 provides:
I.
If any Party considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it under
any provision of:
(a) ... Chapter Six (Energy) relating to investment,
(b) Part Three (Technical Barriers to Trade),
... is being nullified or impaired as a result of the application of any measure that is not inconsistent
with this Agreement, the Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Chapter.
Id. annex 2004.
238. Id. art. 2018(2).
239. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2018.
240. Id. art. 2018(2).
241. As of 1991 trade between the U.S. and Canada was $176 billion and between the U.S. and Mexico
was about $64 billion. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at 2-3. As a whole, Canada and
Mexico account for about 30 percent of U.S. trade and U.S. exports to those countries has grown 50 percent
faster than exports to the rest of the world. Weise PredictsThat Clinton Will Wait Before Moving NAFTA, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 2178 (Dec. 23, 1992) [hereinafter PredictionsConcerning NAFTA].
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and last only until the parties have reached a resolution of the dispute."4 The possibility
of paying excessive damages or risking the effects of a suspension of benefits pressures the
responding party into either removing the restriction or not implementing the restriction
against that particular import."
B.

Will NAFTA Create Loopholes?

This section illustrates the major loopholes that exist within NAFTA and how they affect
U.S. environmental regulations. Many critics of NAFTA believe it will lower U.S.
environmental standards, " while proponents of the agreement believe that NAFTA is the
"greenest trade agreement ever." "5 Indeed, both groups have merit to their assertions.
NAFTA contains more environmental language and addresses more environmental concerns
than any other trade agreement to date." 6 However, it also contains language that bypasses
these green provisions in favor of free trade.2 47 It is the loopholes to the agreement which
are of major concern to environmentalists because, regardless of how green NAFTA appears,
unless the environmental provisions are enforceable, the agreement is ineffective in
protecting the environment.
One such loophole allows a complaining party to choose either GATT or NAFTA to
govern their dispute settlement procedures." 8 This effectively allows a complaining party
to pick the choice of law with the least restrictive requirements. 9 However, this loophole
is limited to disputes that do not involve either chapter 7B or 9.2s Therefore, if a complaint
arises under chapter 6, a complaining party has the discretion to choose either forum for

242.
1.

NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2019(1). Article 2019 Provides:
If in its final report a panel has determined that a measure is inconsistent with the obligations
of this Agreement or causes nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004 and the
Party complained against has not reached agreement with any complaining Party on a mutually
satisfactory resolution pursuant to Article 2018(1) within 30 days of receiving the final report,
such complaining Party may suspend the application to the Party complained against of benefits
of equivalent effect until such time as they have reached agreement on a resolution of the

dispute.
2.

In considering what benefits to suspend pursuant to paragraph 1:
(a) a complaining Party should first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or
sectors as that affected by the measure or other matter that the panel has found to
be inconsistent with the obligations of this Agreement or to have caused nullification
or impairment by the non-complying Party in the sense of Annex 2004; and
(b) a complaining Party that considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend
benefits in the same sector or sectors may suspend benefits in other sectors.
Id. art. 2109.
243.

See U

244. See supra note 9 (illustrating some of the concerns which have been raised by environmental groups).
245. See supra note 6 (illustrating NAFrA support).
246. Testimony, supra note 4.
247. See NAFTA, supra note 5, chs. 1, 6, 7B, 9 & 20. See also supra notes 104-185 and accompanying
text (discussing NAFTA standards).
248. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005.
249. Testimony, supra note 4. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005 (providing an example of an elective
provision).
250. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005. Only a dispute that arises under chapter 6 has the potential for
resolution solely under GAIT. Id. Consequently, a responding party must make a written request to have a
dispute, that arises under chapter 7B or 9, governed solely under NAFTA. Id.
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dispute settlement. 251 But, when a dispute involves either chapter 7B or 9, the responding
party has the ability to request settlement solely under NAFTA.sa This option is designed
to ensure that the greenest agreement is used to settle disputes. 3 Even though NAFTA
contains more green language than any other trade agreement, the loopholes that exist within
NAFTA show that this is just an illusion. '
There are two major loopholes found within chapter 20, s each having several notable
effecis. The first loophole involves the standard that a contracting party must meet in order
to receive recourse rsa To begin, chapter 20 allows a party to challenge an otherwise valid
U.S. environmental regulation and obtain a judgment without having to prove that the
regulation is in violation of NAFTA.2 7 A party only needs to prove that the regulation
nullifies or impairs a benefit that the complaining party expected to receive"
Accordingly, the second loophole relates to the effects of implementing a panel
decision." 9 Regardless of whether an environmental regulation violates NAFTA or merely
impairs the expectation of a complaining party, the regulation is subject to the same four
alternate resolutions. 260These alternatives include: (1) not implementing the regulation
against the previously restricted import; (2) removing the regulation altogether; (3) providing
compensation to the damaged party; or (4) suffering retaliation in the form of suspended
benefits of equal proportion. 6' Because the magnitude and volume of trade regarding any
given product is likely to involve enormous sums of money, 262 the last two alternatives
may result in compensatory damages or suspended benefits beyond what a contracting party
is willing to tolerate. Therefore, the four options for resolution realistically only encompass
two suitable alternatives which, in turn, have the effect of lowering U.S. environmental
standards.2 63 This effect is accomplished in either of two ways. Under the first alternative,
the challenged environmental regulation is not implemented against the previously restricted

251. Supra note 249 and accompanying text. See NAFIA, supra note 5, 2005 (providing an example).
252. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (discussing the choice of law provision found in
chapter 20).
253. See Testimony, supra note 4 (stating that this option provides the responding party with the ability
to avail itself of NAFrA's provisions to establish a scientific review board for advising the dispute settlement
panel). However, it is solely within the discretion of the dispute settlement panel to request a written report from
the appointed scientific review board. NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 2015.
254. See EnvironmentalistsReact Cautiously to Announcement thatNAFTA Completed, 1992 Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (Aug. 14, 1992) available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File.
255. See NAFIA, supra note 5, art. 2018, annex 2004.
256. I11 arts. 2016, 2018. In order to receive a resolution of a dispute, the panel must determine that the
regulation is inconsistent with NAFTA or causes nullification or impairment with regard to a dispute arising
under chapters 6 or 9. Id. art. 2018, annex 2004.
257. Id, arts. 2018-19, & annex 2004. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (stating that all a
party must show is that a benefit they expected to receive was impaired by the regulation). Note that this
loophole only pertains to disputes that arise under chapters 6 and 9. See NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 2004.
258. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2018, annex 2004.
259. Id. arts. 2018-19, & annex 2004.
260. See kd arts. 2018-19. Note that this loophole also effectively undermines any green language found
in chapters 6, 7B and 9 by subjecting a regulation that otherwise complies with NAFTA to the same penalty as
a regulation in violation of NAFTA. See id. art. 2018, annex 2004.
261. Id arts. 2018-19.
262. For example, U.S. imports in 1991, of motor vehicle parts from Canada constituted $4.9 billion, while
crude oil imports from Mexico was $4.3 billion. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1. at 3-4.
263. See NAFIA, supra note 5, arts. 2018-19. See also supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the alternatives available for settlement of disputes).
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import.2" Therefore, even though that regulation is still in force and applicable in other
regards, article 2018 has the effect of invalidating the standards as they apply to that
imported good.265 The second alternative simply removes the entire regulation and thus
effectuates a complete nullification of all of its standards.2"
Another provision that has the potential of creating an enormous loophole is found in
chapter 6 and establishes an exception which reserves to Mexico exclusive rights to certain
activities.267 Although it only pertains to trade in energy and petrochemicals, the scope of
the loophole is exceedingly broad.268 It gives Mexico a tremendous amount of room to
justify actions that may otherwise violate U.S. environmental regulations because it covers
such a broad array of activities.2 69 This exception, taken together with chapter 20, provides
Mexico with the opportunity to effectively challenge an environmental regulation as a trade
barrier.270 For instance, if a regulation in any way affects what is provided for in the
exception,27' then it is likely that Mexico can successfully argue that the regulation places
a restraint on trade and thus violates NAFTA.272 Nevertheless, even if Mexico cannot
prove that the regulation is in violation of NAFTA, chapter 20 still allows a complaining
party to receive retribution as long as they prove nullification or impairment of a benefit.273
Therefore, regardless of whether a panel finds that an environmental regulation violates
NAFTA or merely nullifies or impairs a benefit to Mexico under this exception, the
resolution shall, whenever possible, consist of the nonimplementation or removal of that
regulation.274 As a result, Mexican imports that may otherwise violate U.S. environmental
regulations are nevertheless imported.2 75
Ultimately, these loopholes will provide a method of bypassing U.S. environmental
regulations, resulting in the importation
of products into the United States regardless of
276
whether they violate such regulations.
V. CONCLUSION

NAFTA is a comprehensive and varied trade agreement with over 2,000 pages of text.
Because of the broad scope of NAFTA, its negotiation has generated much controversy and
debate regarding its application and implementation. Although the contracting parties have
attempted to address many of the concerns surrounding such a complex agreement, the

264. NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 2018.
265. Id. Presumably the non-implementation language means that the challenged environmental regulation
will no longer apply to the burdened import but still will have regulatory effect as to domestic products and
other imported goods. See id.
266. Id.
267. I. annex 602.3.
268. 1d See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (defining the scope of annex 602.3).
269. See supranotes 122-24 and accompanying text (describing the various activities that are reserved to
Mexico under annex 602.3).
270. NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 602.3.
271. See supra note 121 (setting forth the text of annex 602.3).
272. See NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 602.3.
273. Id art. 2018. However, in this context the activity claimed by Mexico must relate to investment. Id.
annex 2004.
274. See hd. art. 2018(2).
275. Although this result is restricted only to goods in energy or petrochemicals, in 1989 Mexico exported
about $4 billion in petrochemicals to the United States. NAFTA: Congress Issues, supra note 16, at 14.

276.

See NAFTA, supra note 5, chs. 6, 20.
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proposed text has failed to adequately respond to environmentalist's concerns. 77 Albeit
NAFTA does contain more green language than any other trade agreement to date and is a
great improvement over existing agreements, it is still not enough.
In order to adequately protect existing and future environmental protection efforts it is
necessary to change many of the provisions of NAFTA or to create parallel agreements that
address these concerns, 278 most notable are the provisions dealing with dispute
resolution.2 7 9 As it stands, an environmental regulation that conforms to all of the
provisions of NAFTA, and one that is in direct violation of it, are subject to the same
penalties.280 Instead, NAFTA should provide different penalties depending upon whether
the regulation is in violation or nonviolation of the agreement. But even if this were to occur,
the penalties themselves create serious problems because they may have the potential of
lowering environmental standards. Therefore, the nonimplementation and removal penalties
that exist should undergo revision so that environmental standards will not be subject to
NAFTA's nullifying effect.
NAFTA contains ambiguous and broadly worded provisions which may allow a dispute
panel to invalidate environmental regulations as they apply to imported products. However,
the ambiguities that exist have yet to be interpreted by a panel and, therefore, it is difficult
to determine whether NAFTA will in fact promote environmental protection or favor free
trade. Due to the uncertainty that surrounds the interpretation of NAFTA, the environmental
provisions should undergo revision, whether in the form of supplemental agreements or as
amendments to the implementing legislation. This will help to clarify the standards that exist
within the proposed agreement, facilitate uniform decision making and predictability among
the contracting parties, and increase environmental protection.
If the proposed text of NAFTA is implemented without amendment and side agreements
are not made, NAFTA has the overall effect of lowering environmental regulations by
providing loopholes that allow a contracting party to import a product regardless of whether
it violates an existing environmental regulation. The proposed text also subjects
environmental regulations to attack as trade barriers and thus increases the likelihood that
it will violate NAFTA. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation and
implementation of NAFTA, only time will tell whether it will have a detrimental effect on
the environment.
Jima Ikegawa

277. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (setting forth some environmentalists' concerns).
278. President Clinton has stated that he believes parallel agreements are needed to alleviate the
environmental concerns. Bush Signs,supra note 22, at 2162. But whether the environmental concerns are solved
through side agreements or by directly amending NAFTA text itself, it is likely that some type of reform will
occur. Trade Expert UrgesMore Monitoring of PreferentialTrade Agreements, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2182
(Dec. 23, 1992); PredictionsConcerningNAFTA, supra note 241, at 2178.
279. See supra notes 225-43 and accompanying text (describing dispute settlement procedures under

NAFTA).
280. See NAFTA, supra note 5, arts. 2018-19.

